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Some Estimations of the Lebanese War and Perspective of Strike Iran by the USA

Some Estimations of the Lebanese War and Perspective of Strike Iran by the USA
Source of information: publication was prepared on the base of report of the Institute of Problems of Globalization under edition of M.G. Delyagin 05.09.2006

Results of the Lebanese War

1.       Military aspect

An attack of Israelon Lebanonwas caused by necessity of destruction of infrastructure "Hezbollah" before an attack of the USAon Iranaiming to weaken to the maximum retaliation in the given direction.

The given purpose of war was not executed: "Hezbollah" kept a supervising nucleus and infrastructure (it is probable that it even increased it), raised its popularity, acquired an aura of the winner in war with Israel and, moreover, created its own «belt of safety» on behalf of peacemakers of the United Nations whose heads will be used in case of a new aggravation of situation and will be necessary to strike Israel.

The main reason of an inefficiency of Israel – is "change of generations" in a management of army and special services: to change natives from the East Europe, Northern Africa and the USSR who understood the logic of survival well came rather young people not only received education in the West, but also brought up within the framework of a modern western civilization.

As a result the work of special services had sharply worsened. So, the Israeli investigation service managed "to miss" armament of "Hezbollah" withold grenade cup discharges that punch Israeli tanks as well as armored region less than in kilometer from the border.

The greatest negative consequences "change of generations" in a management had for army. Despite of numerous victims among the peaceful Lebanese population and heart-breaking television reportings, for the first time from the moment of its appearance Israel tried to carry out "humane" war under the western standards, whenever possible sparing another state peaceful population.

Besides the army appeared to be absolutely not ready to new in comparison with the last wars in the Near East (but hopelessly out-of-date from the point of view of global military practice and even the military theory) realities:

- to flexible and maneuverable tactics of "Hezbollah" («to strike and run away») demanding transfer of functions of decision-making directly to the commander of divisions and groups, that appeared to be unacceptable for bureaucratic Israeli army;

- to deep integration of "Hezbollah" into society;

- to the latent character of preparation for operations ("garage" tactics of drawing of impacts);

- to drawing of rocket impacts from close distance: air defense of Israel can intercept rockets at their start at a minimum of about 400 km- in reality they were launched from the distance of 50-100 km.;

- to objective need of conducting secret negotiations and realization of the special actions which are not intended for publicity: procedure of activity of the Israeli government copying advanced democracy does not allow to make not public actions that makes it helpless.

Shocking shortage of the staff of the Israeli special troops caused by long economy of money by the government: it was directed on single antiterrorist operations and it was required to solve the decision as a matter of fact of army problems.

Thus "to lock" "Hezbollah" in Southern Lebanonwas not possible because of the lack of a number of corresponding divisions which physically were not enough to "saddle" all roads.

Due conclusions from that indisputable fact that war in the Near Eastwill never be a classical war of armies anymore (for which Israelwas preparing), apparently, has not been made yet. Now wars will be conducted with guerrilla network structures deeply integrated into societies that is «wars of special services» and excludes democratic procedures of decision-making traditional for the West.

2. Internal Political Aspect

The Lebanese war is considered by the Israeli analysts and, that is more important, by the increasing part of elite as a failure and a feeling of defeat is increasing. The share of Israelis supporting resignation of Olmertonly for the last week has grown from 41 up to 63%.

Israeli military men that used to be the reason for attack, captured after were not returned and were not lost during operation on clearing.

"Humane" war global mass-media presented as a concourse of butchers as during slaughter in Sabraand Shatila (when approximately 10 thousand people were killed, according to estimation of the Israeli analysts, the majority of who were unarmed refugees).

One of the basic myths of Israeli society - a myth of invincibility of army – started to clear away. Moreover: a question of necessity of the war that ended in nothing started to arise in Israel. In fact such questions gradually undermine societies in which they arise.

The most serious thing is that the Israeli society began to get disappointed in itself. It is important that this war for the first time during the last years consolidated the Israeli society: 80% of population agreed with continuation of war but Olmert agreed to stop conducting military actions not having achieved purposes of war. In this connection inevitability of the following war with movement "Hezbollah" dug round in Lebanon is being marked, the war which will be more bloody and accompanying by considerably bigger difficulties for Israel (in particular, international support will be much more weaker; the USA and Saudi Arabia won’t simultaneously consider Israel as the country doing for them their dirty work).

Disappointment of society on a background of its consolidation, evident incapability of pseudo-democratic procedures in the formal - western style and their incompatibility with the requirements of forthcoming conflicts creates high probability of return of Israel to traditional for it and adequate to conditions of its existence of model of "state - special services" in which democratic procedures play extremely formal, decorative role.

However an absence of ideologilized staff necessary for such state is capable to transform it into corrupt dictatorship, and in the long term - to lead it to its crash.

3. Foreign Policy Aspect

War became serious foreign policy defeat of Israel. Celebration of "Hezbollah" and HAMAS fairly considering this war as the defeat of Israel (it failed to reach its targets and they succeded - kept infrastructure, strengthened international support, enormously expanded a circle of the adherents in the Arabian world as a whole and in Lebanon in particular), is dangerous to Israel as soon as it weakens fear before it that makes it more vulnerable.

Unsuccessful impact on "Hezbollah" integrated the movement not only into Southern Lebanonbut also all over the country. Now rocket impacts on Israelwill be rendered from unattainable for armies of Israelsuburbs of Beirutand even northern areas of Lebanon.

The USAand Saudi Arabiathat hoped for success of Israel(the first - for weakening of potential retaliation of Iran, the second - for undermining of its positions in competition for the Islamic world) and assisted it with risk for own reputation and international positions, feel sharp disappointment.

In global strategic game Israelproved to be an inefficient partner. Besides it has been partially discredited in the West by senseless murders of peaceful population which supersede from consciousness of the western societies image of the Jewish people as of a people - victim. As a result the Holocaust ceases to be the termless collective indulgence that threatens with restriction of support of Israelby the West in forthcoming conflicts.

Perspectives of Making a Strike on Iranby the USA

1.Necessity of the limited bombing attack destroying the nuclear program of Iranis caused by the following factors:

- necessity of provoking of waves of patriotism in the USA without which republicans will lose the by-election in November, 2006 being a start of presidential race and will lose authority in 2008 that will lead to a dangerous decrease of their efficiency both in external and internal policy;

- necessity to remind “who is the owner of the world”;

- necessity not to allow appearance of the ideological leader on the Islamic street which will possess the state resources and legitimacy (in particular not to allow competition with Saudi Arabiabeing the strategic partner of the USA);

- inadmissibility of preservation of an ideological appeal – appearance of a state outside the USAworking on the basis of values (which are different from the American and are accessible to all) and not on mercenary material reasons;

- real fear before the threat of appearance of the second Islamic but the first antiAmerican nuclear bomb and a historical neurosis of the American society in relation to Iran;

- necessity to restrain China, the unique tool of which (even in view of its agreement with Venezuela) is the rise of price for oil (in passing bringing superprofits to the American oil companies connected with republican party and constraining other strategic competitors of the USA - the European Community and Japan).

2. On the 31st of August, 2006the term of the ultimatum to Iranexpires. However Security Council of the United Nations cannot introduce against it significant trading sanctions as they will cause unacceptable damage to Chinawhich will not receive from them any benefit.

The USAcannot strike Iranon the basis of the decision of the United Nations. Besides even in case of refusal of Russiaand Chinafrom application of the right of veto theprocedures of the United Nations are too longsome and the Americans should strike so that it has enough time to support the republicans on by-election in November, 2006 which will become also a start of presidential campaign.

However the advanced countries are more inclined to support them in the attack on Iranthan on Iraq. Thus, this impact for support of a republican party still remains in the agenda.

Negative influence of the rise of price for oil caused by it in the world markets on the American economy will be insignificant, military risks - comprehensible.

3.Despite of probable insignificance of short-term, tactical consequences of drawing by the USAlimited impact on Iran, it will finish change of the world order and rules of the global competition started by the attack of the USAand their satellites from NATO to Yugoslaviain 1999.

International law will be de facto replaced finally by the right of power (including propaganda).

Besides desire of the advanced countries it will mean collective refusal of the West from moral leadership in non-Western countries, final transition in relations with them to a policy of deceit and compulsion and, accordingly, to a sharp aggravation of civilized competition.

Radicalization of Islam having created problems for the West, as a whole though not at once, compensates for Chinathe losses caused by rise of the price for oil (especially in view of segmentation of its markets).

4.The conflict because of Iranwith the USAand the West in the whole will be rather serious for Russiathough it will not leave diplomatic frameworks. Probably, refusal to introduce Russiainto WTO on St.-Petersburg summit of "the Great Eight» in 2006 was caused first of all by presence of not solving conflicts between the USAand Russiain connection to Iran.

However this intensity will extremely simplify decision of "problem - 2008". Having released the president from necessity to follow standards of the West inadequate for Russia including the sphere of observance of formally democratic norms, it will create opportunity of «direct and obvious» preservations of authority for the third and the subsequent terms following a sample of some regions of Russia and some of the abroad countries.
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