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|28 may 2017|
«Great November» of the President Medvedev
Deljagin Michael 08.11.2008
Postponed for indefinite time, so it was possible to assume that Presidential Administration of Russia waited for the results of the American elections, the first message of the president Medvedev appeared not at all casually dated to the 91st anniversary of the Great October.
In routine and deeply trite by its nature document (the report of the head of bureaucracy before representatives of this very bureaucracy, open to seeing it by people) sparkles of revolution unexpectedly started to shine.
Actually, now it is necessary to discuss two things: whether it will be possible and whether he understood himself what he was going to do?
Medved's message contains description of a deep political reform. Dot and as if local change made together would change the content of a political system of Russia, leaving its form practically without change.
The main changes - the offer to the president of the nominees of governors by the parties gathered the majority at corresponding regional elections and placing the government under the parliamentary control (that is a direct impact on Putin - he grew dark very much after those words though he should foreknow the content of the message).
The first liberates governors from under Putin's control (now their nominees are brought to the president by plenipotentiaries controllable by prime-minister) and transfers them under control of "Edinaya Russia", in practice - under control of Presidential Administration of the president Medvedev supervising "Edinaya Russia".
The second puts the government under control of the same "Edinaya Russia", that is also of Presidential Administration of Medvedev.
As a matter of fact, Меdvedev put dot impacts on the key power structures refusing to recognize him as the head of the country. He could not take directly under his control the government really subordinated to Putin - and gave it under indirect (through "Edinaya Russia") control of administration. He also could not achieve recognition of frankly thumbing him down governors - so, he made with them the same.
However aspiration to this clear and transparent tactical purpose leads to strategic changes. They are enormous: political parties get independent imperious resource and start to supervise the government through the State Duma (Меdvedev used the word).
As a matter of fact it is a transition to parliamentary republic for which, for example, Khodorkovsky stood.
Yes, now it's only a transfer of a part of authority to "Edinaya Russia", densely controllable by Presidential Administration - but, having found independent influence, it could get released from this control; besides other parties could start increasing their influence. In particular, the governor, wishing to get free from under too rigid control of the center, can stake on some minor party, provide its victory in regional elections and own promotion to the governors from its name. This circuit works, even if the corresponding decision is being accepted not by regional branch of the party but its federal management (though here unwillingness to quarrel with Presidential Administration assumes significance).
For a while it is essential that "Edinaya Russia", finding independent imperious resource, starts to depend less on the formal leader - Putin whose influence on it starts losing its sources.
Planned reduction of federal bureaucracy in the regions - a step directed not only on restoration of rights of regions. It also can be used against Putin as in any case it will mean reduction of influence of the government controllable by him and basically can be directed against the structures most necessary to him (for example, against plenipotentiaries).
Undermining of party bureaucracy by means of introduction of a rule of rotation of a party management - preparation of the ground for creation of new party elites which after a while can become support to Medvedev and be competitors to "Edinaya Russia", having made him national president - "the president of all parties".
After sharp restriction of a number of parties they are supposed to be given essential indulgences: decrease in requirements to the number of members of party, admission into the State Duma of representatives of the parties which got 5-7%, cancellation of a monetary pledge (that limits opportunities of business and expands opportunities of parties enjoying public support, but it also allows to remove them from elections guaranteed on arbitrariness of electoral committees on the basis of ostensibly false signatures), reduction in quantity of signatures (that facilitates position of parties), guarantees of notification about activity of parliamentary parties in mass-media.
Together with election (or appointment) of members of the Federation Council from among elite into the regional parliaments (that means return of a part of powers to regions and a step from Putin's centralization to almost Eltsin's federalism) mitigation of requirements to parties reflects the general decrease in centralization, aspiration to make regional and local activity really active.
Меdvedev follows Gorbachev's way: not seeing ways out from economic problems, he tries to find the way out making political transformations, expansion of public freedom. The given way as the experience of the Soviet Union has shown, is essentially vicious and rather dangerous. However the very first steps should be welcomed, as they promote normalization of a public and political life of the country.
Admission of public organizations to elections to local self-management is represented by attempt to avoid transformation of bodies of the last into "clubs of directors".
Inclusion of world courts into federal judicial system means deprivation of their independence, to be exact - replacement of the regional control over them by federal one.
As any revolutionary step in struggle for authority the message about intention to carry out these reforms is supplemented by peace-offering of potential opponents and allies of the opponent suppressed. In this case the antiAmerican rhetoric (though quite moderate on a background of some sounded intentions) cajoled Putin's potential allies - security officials and militarians
Nevertheless business and especially fund operators got frightened of that application (though the principal cause of the decrease in quotations of the share market was caused by correction of the American market after electoral rally).
Demonstration of Medvedev's sincere belief that the purposes put by him are already achieved is the most frightening in the message: democracy is built, factories are under construction (assuming that constructions are not working for already two months), the state is social (though it is cancelled by monetization of privileges). Lecture on Constitution - assuming that the state practically does not pay any attention to it - and conversations on representation of the population in parliament which absurdity on a background of monstrous falsifications of elections even yard-keeper understands is especially bright in this relation.
It seems to be not simply ritual propaganda gesture but a display of really existing and very deep isolation from reality - at that not only president Medvedev taken separately but all Putin's statehood as such.
The offer to prolong the term of presidential powers up to 6 years - is not only a way to distract attention discussing the message on obviously minor but bright and attention-getting detail. It's also evident demonstration of that he came "seriously and for long", he could allow himself from the first steps what his powerful predecessor failed to go - to update of the Constitution.
Prolongation of powers of the State Duma for one year - on the one hand, is a payoff of the future political ally, on the other - demonstration that the president is higher than deputies (his term is being prolonged for two years, while their - only for one), thirdly - bringing into compliance the term of the deputy appointment to the terms of appointment of the governors and institutes of local government.
Thus, if now parliamentary elections are rehearsal of the presidential ones, under the new order (if it will be realized) terms of parliamentary and presidential elections will be shifted constantly relative to each other, that will create constant political variety.
Economy: Deafening and Convincing Silence
It is essential that Меdvedev practically passed up examination of economic problems, having emphasized only that "crisis will be long" and specified that responsibility for solving of the problems available is on the government and Bank of Russia. Thus, he fixed on Putin the responsibility for essentially resisting solution within the framework of the political system created by him social and economic problems and shifted off it from himself, having concentrated on legal, theoretical and ideological aspects.
Alongside with it indication on necessity "to push financial thromb" reminds of the year 1992 as the word-combination "financial blood thromb" was used only then (probably, both Меdvedev and composers of the text simply don't know about it).
In second half of 1992 Central Bank poured in economy money, hoping to support the real sector covered with non-payments (they referred to as "financial thrombs"), however in absence of the financial control they went to speculative currency market, while non-payments accrued. It was natural then, there was simply no state; reproduction of that situation, even in the weakened form, recognized usage of the same term testifies extreme weakness and, as a matter of fact, fictitiousness of the statehood created by Putin.
The European Community and the USA, filling in their problems with cheap money, will stimulate demand and will leave from crisis; the Russian state does not show desire and abilities even to try to make necessary measures (to stimulate state demand for production of real sector at restriction of arbitrariness of monopolies and cutting off of the financial help from the speculative markets).
«Obama's Spirit» in Georgievsky Hall
Republican presidents of the USA pursue a policy focused on interests, while democratic - on values. It is one of the reasons why it's quite simple to our leaders to agree with republican presidents, though they usually take a rigid anti-soviet or antiRussian position and rather difficult - with presidents - democrats, no matter how soft they would seem to be.
Orientation of Medvedev's message on values, ideals and principles seems to be reflection of not only his personal and professional (as the lawyer) beliefs but also of "Obama's spirit": Меdvedev in classical Putin's style "flips" interlocutor, acting in his style and manner and providing thus certain sympathy to himself.
Thus, correspondence dialogue of president Medvedev with president Obama has been started next day after election of the last - and it's correct.
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