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Japan Is Becoming a Nuclear Empire

Japan Is Becoming a Nuclear Empire
Alexander Magidovich 26.12.2006

On Monday the Japanese newspaper "Sunkey" published the content of the governmental document dated the 20th of September which informed about the plans of creation of nuclear warheads of the limited capacity. The newspaper noted that it had been made before underground nuclear test on October, 9th in Northern Korea.

Pilot production of nuclear charges can begin already in three years - is stated in the document. For creation of nuclear warheads for rockets - in 3-5 years, for their manufacture and maintenance of work of several hundreds scientists would be necessary to spend 200-300 billion yens (about $2-3 billion). Nevertheless, even thus, its authors consider, "Japan won’t be in time to answer adequately nuclear threat from the part of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea".

The government of Japan did not make such document. It was declared at morning press conference by the secretary general of cabinet Jasuhisa Siodzaki on Monday in Tokyo.

"The government doesn’t know anything about existence of the detailed document", - Siodzaki said.

It is obvious that technically Japan is quite capable to provide production of nuclear weapon in short terms. And most likely, sooner or later, according to the promulgated plan or under other plan, Japan will possess the nuclear weapon as already today there are 3 nuclear empires - Russia, China and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea - in the nearest environment of the country.

It is possible to believe that in the same short terms South Korea which also doesn’t have technological obstacles for creation of own nuclear forces of restraint will get own nuclear potential. Basically, Australia which armed forces on a regular basis take part in conflicts of last time is technologically ready to similar step.

Technological readiness of two large Islamic countries of the region - Indonesia and Malaysia - causes doubts as to the creation of own nuclear forces. However both countries give weight to the development and equipment of armed forces, as on the basis of import of armament and military techniques and to production of own samples, however, as a rule, copying already existing. The general direction on creation of own rocket-nuclear forces in the Islamic world is obvious enough on the example of Pakistan and Iran. Actually, such tendency  looks quite logically also for other large Islamic countries among which there is Indonesia – the largest Islamic state as to the quantity of population. 

At that creation of own nuclear forces will remind "chain reaction". Nuclear preparations of India and Pakistan were absolutely mutual process, the nuclear program of Japan would become only the answer to the testing of the nuclear weapon by Northern Korea and so on.

The majority of experts consider that in the first half of the 21-st century and not after 2020 the club of nuclear powers will be extended so that it will include the countries with an average level of technological and economic development. It can be 20-25 states with the most different internal political modes and various geopolitic aspirations, including states of the former USSR.

The probability of the local nuclear conflict at such big number of participants of the process becomes rather significant.

An opportunity of purchase of own nuclear potential by non-state formations that is technically quite possible causes even more fears. There are no doubts that such preparations will have as their object not defensive reasons, as in case with nuclear programs of the legitimate states, but exclusively nuclear blackmail.

Strong argument for the dialogue with the world community can become possession of nuclear potential also for non-recognized states, even if it would be technologically imperfect armament. In particular, demonstration of nuclear potential by the non-state structure can precede demonstration of the self-proclaimed mode aspiring to get the status of the state.

In particular, the USA could not, didn’t want (and according to some information - even helped) to prevent Pakistan to get own nuclear warheads and to get means of their delivery. Today the mode in Pakistan is unstable, the central government does not supervise all territory of the country. Moreover, on the territory of Pakistan the independent "Islamic" state Vaziristan has been proclaimed. May be already tomorrow the control over nuclear forces in Pakistan can pass to structures with the most exotic orientation – to become the weapon of Worldwide Jihad or to get into the arms of dissidents.

It’s quite natural in such situation for neighbouring countries to get own nuclear forces but the principle of nuclear restraint itself as it has been formulated in the XX century doesn’t work any longer today. Availability of nuclear forces of restraint cannot be effective against forces which are not afraid at all of a nuclear attack of punishment, moreover, it’s not excluded that they will be provoke it.

The West, as always, offers a system of the total control, the world chase and logic of preventive impacts. But this tactics has already choked in Afghanistan and Iraq. No forces were left for Northern Korea- that is the first thing. And the second is that - this tactics of the West has induced Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran to own nuclear development as in due time explosion in Alamogordo has forced the USSR to open own nuclear program.

Today's nuclear preparations of Japan, certainly, is a reaction to the testing in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. But they are only a consequence - including consequences of participation of the Japanese military contingent in operations of NATO of last time and presence of the American military bases on the territory of Japan - but the main thing, certainly, is reaction to an aggressive policy of the USA and the NATO not confused to apply armed forces where they considered it suitable and favourable.

Today "process has gone" and it will be difficult to stop it. Or impossible.

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